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Lawyer's Perspective*
PROFESSOR DAVID SKOVER: Good afternoon, and welcome to
the symposium on The First Amendment on Trial: The Libel Lawyer's
Perspective. In several significant ways, this event is a first. It is the
first symposium to be held in Seattle University School of Law since
the recent dedication of our magnificent new building. It is the first
symposium of its kind ever to be held in the great Northwest. Fur-
thermore, law school and law review symposia typically focus more on
free speech theory than they do on the First Amendment in practice.
As the Seattle University Law Review will be transcribing and publish-
ing an account of this event, I thought it would be interesting to do a
quick electronic search for free speech symposia in law journal litera-
ture. To my knowledge, then, this will be the first law review sympo-
sium to feature only prominent figures in the First Amendment libel
trenches, those who face the daunting challenges of libel law on trial.
Finally, this is surely the first symposium to gather the particular
panel of distinguished libel law experts here today.
Before I introduce them to you, allow me to comment briefly on
one of the most dominant tensions in the libel law arena. Paul
McMasters, the First Amendment ombudsman for The Freedom
Forum, succinctly captured this tension when he wrote, "[T]here is
much unsettled and unsettling about an area of law that so profoundly
affects how journalists do their job and how the people get their news.
On the one hand, libel suits are a necessary recourse for those who
* This is an edited version of the transcript of a roundtable discussion held in November
1999 at Seattle University School of Law. Participants included Professor David Skover, Seattle
University School of Law, who moderated the discussion; the Honorable Robert S. Lasnik of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Sandra Baron, executive
director of the Libel Resource Defense Center; Ronald Collins of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest; John Shaeffer, partner at the firm of O'Donnell & Shaeffer; and Bruce Johnson,
partner at Davis Wright Tremain LLP.
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believe that they have been wronged by the press. On the other, even
the threat of a libel suit can serve as a subtle censor of the press."' It is
difficult to disagree with Mr. McMasters. Individuals who claim
reputational injury from news stories often point to the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark 1962 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
2
and its progeny to complain that too much legal protection has been
guaranteed to the press. They feel that they are trapped in a Catch-
22. Just at the point that they enjoy enough public recognition to
show a real injury to their reputation, they risk becoming public fig-
ures who are unlikely to prevail in litigation against the press.
In contrast, recent developments demonstrate how the mere
prospect of an expensive and time-consuming libel suit is often
enough to drive the press to self-censorship. Excessive caution by
publishers threatens to undermine the First Amendment goals for a
free press, in the words of Justice William Brennan, "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open public discourse."3 Consider only a few exam-
ples from 1999. Oprah Winfrey, America's most popular TV talk
show host, broadcast a program entitled "Dangerous Food," and was
sued by Texas cattle ranchers in federal district court, alleging that she
libeled the beef industry. Winfrey prevailed at the trial level in that
litigation, but for a defendant who is not as well-heeled as Oprah, the
very threat of a product disparagement suit may be enough to silence
the whistle-blower.
St. Martin's Press recently recalled a biography of Presidential
candidate George W. Bush, entitled Fortunate Son, that accused him
of being arrested once on cocaine charges. The revelation, contained
in the afterword to the book, was based on three anonymous sources.
When the Bush campaign flatly denied the charges, and the identity of
the author as a former felony convict was uncovered, the mass media
struggled over whether or how to handle the events, for fear of being
accused of republishing a libel. It was Internet-based journals like
Salon4 and the Drudge Report,5 and not the traditional mass media,
that were willing to put the story into play. Salon's senior vice presi-
dent explained: "[T]he Internet generally [isn't] really interested in
the corporate-gatekeeper model of deciding [what to publish]." 6
1. Paul McMasters, Libel: Subtle Censor of the Press, THE FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE,
posted at http://www.freedomforum.org/first/1999/1/4/ombudsman.asp (published January 4,
1999).
2. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Id. at 270.
4. See <http://www.salon.com/>.
5. See <http://www.drudgereport.com/>.
6. Howard Kurtz, Bush Accuser Is Said to Be Ex-Convict, WASHINGTON POST ONLINE,
posted at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/Wplate/1 9 9 9-10/22/1241-102299-idx.
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There is also the recent Food Lion7 litigation, about which more will be
said later.
This afternoon we are fortunate, indeed we are honored, to have
five highly able and widely recognized experts to discuss these and
other thorny issues pervasive in a libel law practice. Allow me now to
introduce them. To my immediate right is Judge Robert S. Lasnik,
who has sat on the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington since 1998. Judge Lasnik previously was Chief of Staff in
the King County Prosecutors' Office and a King County Superior
Court Judge. He graduated with a masters degree in journalism from
Northwestern University.
To his right is Sandra S. Baron, the Executive Director of the
Libel Defense Resource Center, a nonprofit membership organization
of media entities, associations, foundations, insurers, and law firms
nationwide, located in New York City. Ms. Baron oversees the associ-
ation's promotion of First Amendment rights in libel, privacy, and
related fields. She previously served as Senior Managing Attorney at
NBC, as Associate General Counsel of the Educational Broadcasting
Corporation, and as general counsel of American Playhouse. More-
over, she is the co-author of a major treatise on libel law.
To her right is Ronald Collins, the director of a First Amend-
ment project at the Center for Science in the Public Interest in Wash-
ington, D.C. Mr. Collins undertakes legislative and judicial battles
against state food disparagement and product libel laws. He recently
co-authored an amicus brief in support of Oprah Winfrey's defense in
the beef-libel case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit' and has written on the subject of product disparagement.9 Many
of you also know him as my co-author of our book, The Death of Dis-
course,10 and our forthcoming work, Comedy on Trial: Lenny Bruce's
Struggles for Free Speech.
To his right is John Shaeffer, one of the founding partners of
O'Donnell & Shaeffer in Los Angeles. Mr. Shaeffer practices in the
areas of intellectual property, entertainment law, libel, and privacy.
He recently represented the writer Barbara Chase Riboud in her copy-
right claim against the film Amistad, and represented a consortium of
journalists and newspapers in their successful effort to open to the
public Jeffrey Katzenberg's compensation claim against Disney.
html> (published October 22, 1999).
7. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
8. Texas Beef Group, et al., v. Oprah Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000).
9. Ronald K.L. Collins, Free Speech, Food Libel, and the First Amendment... in Ohio, 26
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2000).
10. RONALD K. L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (1996).
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
Finally, to his right is Bruce Johnson, a partner in the Seattle
office of Davis Wright Tremaine. Mr. Johnson is well-experienced in
defamation and privacy defense, having represented the media in a
number of First Amendment cases, including Auvil v. CBS 60 Min-
utes11 and CBS, Inc. v. Davis.1 2 Each panelist will now be given five
minutes for an opening statement. These statements will highlight
what in their opinions are the most prickly problems for libel law
practitioners today. After these introductory remarks, the panel will
engage in a roundtable discussion of several hypothetical scenarios
that I will present to them. We will end the discussion so as to leave
time for you to pose your own questions. And when that time comes I
urge all of you to exercise your First Amendment rights freely. Let us
begin, then, with opening statements. Sandra, would you grace us,
please.
SANDRA BARON: I want to thank David Skover and Seattle
University School of Law for inviting me to participate in this sympo-
sium on the litigation of libel. Because of my background, I tend to
take a relatively pragmatic perspective, and what I see are a number of
issues that make this litigation challenging for defendants. Lest they
go unsaid at all in this discussion, as fraught with emotions as divorce,
I thought I would mention just three.
One is so-called libel by implication. The second is actual mal-
ice, and specifically here, because actual malice can cover a wide range
of sins or issues in libel litigation, overcoming plaintiffs' efforts to
prove malice by the accumulation of circumstantial bits; e.g., a failure
to interview a particular witness here, a failure to reach the plaintiff to
comment there. Piling them one on top of one another, hoping that
the sum will equal actual malice. And finally, while perhaps not on
Professor Skover's list of what he meant by difficult libel litigation
issues, I think I should mention the high, if not prohibitive, cost of
litigating libel cases. Cost can be virtually determinative of libel liti-
gation for small publishers, and is a factor I would suggest in almost
every libel litigation.
With that I am going to double back a little bit and start with
libel by implication. This complaint can be brought even when much,
if not all, of what is actually said in a publication is true or is not
otherwise subject to liability. It is a plaintiff's charge that the publica-
tion is libelous because the reader or the viewer or the listener can
come away with an impression from the totality that is defamatory. I
11. Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 67 F.3d 816 (9thCir. 1995).
12. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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can tell you that when asked, media defense counsel list this as a libel
litigation challenge more than any issue in libel litigation.
Litigating claims of libel by implication is really an attempt at
shadow boxing. You are suddenly defending a statement that the
reporter or writer did not make, that he and his editors did not see in
the publication, that you cannot perhaps defend as true, or, even
worse, that your reporter believes may be false. The arguments, I can
tell you, quickly play out in all sorts of various alternatives. You start
with what did the story mean, convincing the judge or maybe a jury it
does not mean what plaintiff says it does, or that the implication,
while plausible, is not the most reasonable, or certainly not the only
one. Or, if the implication can be understood from the story, that it is
protected opinion. Or, and ultimately I would suggest to you this is
how most cases are litigated, proving you were not at fault; in an
actual malice case, that you did not know you were publishing a
defamatory implication.
I am going to note that the press, I think, is increasingly winning
the argument that, at least in cases where actual malice is the standard,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew the implication was
in the piece as well as knew it was false. And in some jurisdictions,
libel by implication claims simply cannot be brought when the plain-
tiff is a public figure or public official, or when the underlying facts of
the story are true and the subject matter is one of public concern.
These are not yet, however, universal approaches.
Actual malice is the second difficult litigation issue. Because of
the enormous cost of litigating, both in financial and in human terms,
the utmost goal of most libel defendants is to win a case before trial.
Oftentimes they will move for summary judgment on the issue of the
inability of the plaintiff to prove the defendant published false,
defamatory statements of fact with actual malice. That is, for those of
you who are not familiar with the actual malice standard, knowing that
what was published was false or with such reckless disregard for truth
as to be tantamount to publishing knowingly false statements.
I think you can start from the premise that this standard is
counterintuitive for many jurors, and for some judges as well. There
is a tendency, I think, to assume that if there is a mistake in the story it
is the defendants that should suffer for it. And in some jurisdictions, I
will tell you, judges-regardless of what they think of actual malice-
are reluctant as a general matter to grant summary judgment motions.
Moreover, I think you have to take as a given that every story, every
book, and every article is going to have some flaws in the text or in the
preparation, or most likely in both. These are, after all, human
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endeavors we are talking about. In addition, reporting has some alto-
gether unattractive attributes. Sometimes reporters are hard-sale.
Sometimes they are demanding. Sometimes they are soft and sweet,
even when the end result is going to be a very hard-nosed investigative
piece. Sometimes they use sources that judges and juries don't like.
There is always going to be more, I can assure you, the reporter could
have done in preparation of the story. And with outtakes in television
available for everyone to review, there will always be evidence of
material that could have been included in the story.
So then what should constitute sufficient or adequate evidence to
deny the defendant summary judgment on actual malice? The chal-
lenge for a lot of counsel is to overcome both initial antipathy for the
actual malice standard and antipathy for summary judgment, and ulti-
mately, counsel must help the judge, or jury if it comes to that,
understand how a reporter works, what is acceptable, even if unattrac-
tive in reporting, and what is acceptable and what is not, as proof of
actual malice.
SKOVER: Thank you. John, would you like to make your state-
ment?
JOHN SHAEFFER: I come from kind of a different background
from my colleagues in that I'm a person who prosecutes libel cases, so
I bring a different theory to this type of discussion. First thing, I
think it's important to understand that when we're talking about libel,
we are talking about First Amendment issues. Those who tend to
represent defendants like to focus on respected journalistic reporting.
But in actuality libel is much broader than that. Not only does it
cover journalism, news media, the media and its proliferating news
shows, but the ugly stepchild, tabloid journalism. An area I've been
involved in a lot recently is books, which pose even different issues in
terms of libel. Typically, in most journalism, there is a rush to get the
story out because news has a short time frame. When you're dealing
with a book you usually have a longer time frame, and as a person
representing plaintiffs in these issues, my approach to a book tends to
be very different than the approach to a newspaper story. Finally, the
one I'm finding most interesting now is in the area of entertainment. I
was talking to my colleagues this morning about an instance that came
up in my practice recently. I represent the pharmaceutical company
Pfizer. Last season, on the show Law & Order, Julia Roberts tried to
kill her lover using one of my client's drugs, Viagra.13 Does that pose
any libel type issues? Well, I'm also defending litigation for Pfizer
13. A virtually identical plot starring Victoria Principal aired on The Practice, (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, Apr. 2, 2000).
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right now because people are claiming causal relationship between
heart attacks and the ingestion of Viagra. Was there any basis for Law& Order to do this? It's also interesting because shows like Law &
Order hold themselves out as being reality-based, or stories based
somehow on the truth. Did viewers take away from that show a beliefthat Viagra actually could cause a heart attack? Ultimately, we
decided it didn't make any sense to publicly pursue litigation.
I think the main point that you will hear from my perspective isthat despite the lamenting you'll hear from my colleagues on the
defense side, the decks are about as stacked against a plaintiff as they
possibly could ever be. Probably the most important factor is public-
ity. When a client comes in and says, "I've been defamed by thispiece on 20/20, or by this piece of journalism, and I want to sue," I tell
them that by suing, you will draw significantly more media attention
to the story than probably was there before. A good example is thenew movie, The Insider. I don't know if you've seen all these Brown &
Williamson ads saying this movie's not true because of XYZ and allthese other reasons. Well, they are creating controversy, creating
advertising for the show. More people are going to go see it, and morepeople are going to hear the bad statement. Libel actions live a lotlonger than media stories. The public's attention is about five or ten
minutes for the types of stories that make the newspaper. When you
sue it goes on forever. One of the great examples is Carol Burnett's
victory over a tabloid which, a number of years ago, accused her of
being drunk in some restaurant. 14 That litigation went on for years.And even though the case ultimately settled, the story was in the pub-
lic consciousness every time there was a decision.
Defendants, the big media companies, always complain about
how expensive these types of claims are. They're also very, veryexpensive from the plaintiff's perspective, many of whom tend to be
individuals. There was an article recently in the L.A. Times in August
about a group of lawyers in Los Angeles who do this tabloid type oflitigation on behalf of stars. Well, if you look at most of those cases,
they drag out for long periods of time. While the star may ultimately
prevail, he or she is awarded $100,000, $2, whatever it is, to the pointthat clearly it was much more expensive to prosecute this libel claim
than they ultimately recovered.
Finally, let's look at what happens with these cases. First of all,
my client's upset because the story's not true. Well, it doesn't matterif it's true or not. The class or the defendant can prevail, even if thestory's false. So let's look at the result of the case. I can prove the
14. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. 3d 991 (1983).
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statement was false but lose because it wasn't reckless, so the public
perceives the story as being true. I can win proving actual malice, but
be awarded little or nominal damages. The public still believes that
the media has prevailed. So, in most instances caution against bring-
ing a libel action and try to address these concerns before they reach
the press.
I do think it's important to understand perceptions. People in
the media business believe right now, because of the state of law, that
they're under siege by litigation that is restricting First Amendment
rights among the press. I think it's been very important for us to
understand that freedom of the press is broader in the United States
than any country in the world. While there may be some nibbling
back at the corners, these inroads are nothing compared to the risks
the media faces in places like England, where Tom Cruise recently
prevailed on his claims against a tabloid.
The public perceives a level of arrogance amongst the media.
But I come here to make a bold statement that I'm actually the advo-
cate of the public in these claims. In all respects except one, which is
the public's right to know. But you do see a real clash between the
public's right to know and the public's belief that there are notions of
privacy that are held by all of us, and many times the media can lie,
cheat, and steal to get a story, but the public sees that as wrong. So
what's the problem? I think the problem we're seeing today is a
problem of mass and velocity. Right now there's a lot more informa-
tion coming out, and the rush to get it out is intense. What previously
was given a couple of pages is now a sound bite. You may have a
hundred facts necessary to tell the story. The newspaper editor must
now tell the story with only five or ten. And obviously he's going to
spin those facts in a manner that will draw interest to the story. That
is where the conflict is.
So what am I doing now? Well, typically what I do in many of
these cases is I try to get the story before the story goes to press. I
have worked many times with books. I represented a prominent
music publisher who was being defamed horribly in a book that was
about to come out. We were able to get to the book before it came
out, resolve a lot of the issues, to the point that the book became very
boring. But our battle was the press, the book publisher wanted these
sensational facts in there and wanted to use our controversy as a basis
to sell books. There we were successful because I doubt anyone in this
room ever read the book. The book came out and no one knows who I
represented, so I think we were successful. The last thing I do, and I
know my time's running out, the last thing we do now in this broader
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economy we have, that is we sue in other countries. I've advised cli-
ents to sue in France, I've advised clients to sue in Ireland, where the
First Amendment rights are not as broad. And we're prevailing in
those. So these multinational corporations with great protection from
the United States don't have those protections in the other countries,
and I think that's going to be a real proving ground.
SKOVER: Thank you, John. Judge Lasnik, would you make
your opening statement?
HON. ROBERT LASNIK: Thank you. My perspective, of course,
as a jurist watching some of these cases come through, is different than
the advocates here but it's very representative of what you see, in that
each one tries to cloak their side with truth and justice and the Ameri-
can way, and each one attempts to posture themselves as sort of the
little guy up against the big enemy. And when you represent CBS or
the New York Times it's hard to convey the impression that you're a
little guy. But even when the media client is a little guy I think you'll
see that the lawyers who represent the media try to be aware of every
case out there, because the wrong case that goes up without proper
representation can affect their clients down the road. So they're - if
you pick a fight with any media organization you should expect to
have a nuclear war on your hands. In a case that I handled with
Bruce's law firm, it looked like a very small case, involved a Seattle
Weekly person, who was not particularly a famous person, who just
felt that he was treated very shabbily in a particular article. And a solo
practitioner plaintiffs lawyer took the case for him, and the discovery
that ensued over the next few months was so overwhelming to this
lawyer and so pervasive about the background of the plaintiff. He's
seeking damages, that opens up all sorts of areas of his background for
questioning about tax returns and financial dealings and whatever. I
think by the time I granted the summary judgment for the media, I
think that the plaintiff and his lawyer were relieved to get out the case.
They couldn't just withdraw but they certainly were not anxious to
fight again another day. The other thing I've had a lot of experience
in, as Chair of the Bench Bar Press Fire Brigade in the State of Wash-
ington, to try to put out flare-ups that occur in the courtroom revolv-
ing around media issues. I think I have a lot of friends in the media.
The one time they cringe is when I'm doing a case and I'm talking to a
jury ahead of time, and the issue is pretrial publicity and do we need
to close the courtroom, do we need to move the trial into another
venue .... I engage in a little discussion with potential jurors about
how many of them have ever had something that they were personally
involved with covered by a newspaper or television. And most peo-
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pie's hands will go up. Something happened at their school or their
job or that they were involved in. And I'd say, in those circumstances
how many times did the media get it right, and nobody's hand goes
up. And I say, well, why do you expect that they got it right in this
case either, so just set aside whatever you read about this particular
case and we'll just move forward. And the heads nod and they say
yeah, you know, that's true. So the media wins because they get to
stay, but they always come up to me afterwards and say, "I don't
know whether I really like the way you did that, judge, but we are glad
we get to stay in the courtroom and cover." I think it's fair to say that
the media does not hold a very high regard in the public for accuracy,
for fairness, for the things that they have aspired to. There are many
reasons for that, some we can talk about here today. But the fact of
the matter is, I think when you come right down to what makes this a
great country in terms of our government system, two of the things
you have to look at are an independent judiciary, which is virtually
unique, and freedom of the press and freedom of expression in the
First Amendment, which likewise is almost unique in the world.
Thank you.
SKOVER: Thank you, Judge. Bruce, would you give us your
statement, please?
BRUCE JOHNSON: I'd like to divide my statement into three
parts. The first part I'll call "context and inspiration." The second
part I call "kvetching." And the third part I call "fears about the
future." Let me start with context and inspiration. It's important for
us to recognize and never forget that modern press freedom was a gift
of the civil rights movement. The extent to which the American
media forget that this is not a great corporate success story but is in
fact the success brought by very, very hard working, struggling people
who battled largely in the South (but also in the North) for civil rights
laws a generation ago cannot be overstressed. And when you defend a
libel case, when you have to stand in front of a jury, it's very impor-
tant to remember this is a right which was won for all of us. Not sim-
ply by corporations, but by individuals who were struggling for
freedom. This was brought home to me three weeks ago when I made
a presentation in Warsaw as a guest of the Polish Journalists' Associa-
tion and the Polish Press Freedom of Monitoring Center. I was asked
to discuss American press law with these journalists who came not
simply from Poland, but also from Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine, Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic, and even Russia. This
was ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. One of the people I
spoke to on that trip, a friend of mine in Latvia, recalled a cold Christ-
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mas night many years ago in the Latvian Socialist Republic in the
Soviet Union when she happened to break out in a song that she had
heard somewhere, which was Silent Night. This was in the U.S.S.R.
Two of her colleagues quickly cautioned her not to use that song and
to quiet down immediately, because she could be reported for singing
Silent Night.
When I made my presentation to the Polish gathering, I was try-
ing to explain American press law and American press freedom, and
said, "I don't know if I am the one to explain press freedom to you.
Within the last ten years you have reconstructed civil society. You
have created civic morality out of nothing. You have brought to bear
within the Soviet empire something which is not simply uninhibited,
robust and wide open, but something that goes to the heart of all of
us." So I felt very modest in talking about press freedom, but some of
the Poles, the Eastern Europeans, looked at me and said, "When we
were in the Gdansk shipyards in 1980 and 1981, we sang We Shall
Overcome." All of this press freedom in the United States, and indeed
in Europe and in the former Soviet Union, is of a single origin. It
comes from people being willing to struggle-not simply the media,
but all of us, willing to struggle for our rights.
Even freedom, of course, is a double-edged sword. One of the
other points ironically made by the journalists in this Warsaw gather-
ing was, while we struggled for our rights, nobody is reading us now.
They are living in a very typical, very modern, normal society again,
and folks are tuning them out oddly enough, and that was one of the
major complaints among reporters. They also complained about their
salaries, so we are clearly arriving at Western society bit by bit. But
it's important to remember that inspiration, because New York Times
v. Sullivan was itself the product of a struggle to call attention to very
important injustices in this country.
Kvetching. I'm going to divide my kvetching into three different
categories. First, the law. The largest single concern I have about the
law dealing with the media derives from a 1991 U.S. Supreme Court
case, Cohen v. Cowles Media.i" It concerns a Minnesota newspaper
which decided to reveal the name of a confidential source, who was
actually an operative for a political opponent, and the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a state law claim for
promissory estoppel damages by that source against the newspaper.
The Court went on to hold that the First Amendment is not impli-
cated when laws of general applicability are used against the media in
connection with news gathering torts. That area of the law is still very
15. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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unsettled, as recent decisions in the Food Lion case within the last
month will show you. But it's not just the law. It's judges and it's
jurors. Last week, at a dinner organized by Sandy Baron's group, the
Libel Defense Resource Center, Abner Mikva reminded the crowd
that when he left the D.C. Circuit bench and became White House
counsel, he told the media, "Watch out, there is a backlash among the
judges." At the same dinner, Nina Totenberg, an N.P.R. reporter,
talked about the Supreme Court's attitude and the media, and it was
very succinct. She said, "They hate us." She described the mood as
similar to Jackie Gleason's classic comment, "One of these days,
Alice, it's going to be Pow! right in the kisser."
But it's not just judges. Jurists also are reflecting attitudes of
distrust and alienation from the media. Floyd Abrams, a leading First
Amendment lawyer, has suggested that the press will pay dearly for
the Bill and Monica story. In a recent survey of Americans sponsored
by Freedom Forum, fifty-three percent of respondents said that the
press has too much freedom. That's a majority. And this is up from
thirty-eight percent in 1997. Two years, from 1997 to 1999, thirty-
eight percent to fifty-three percent disapproved of media rights. In
the same study, sixty-five percent of Americans say that the press
should be free to publish freely without government approval of its
story. Isn't that nice of them? That's down from eighty percent two
years earlier. And those supporting the media's right to report gov-
ernment secrets, also a basic First Amendment tenet, have dropped
from sixty-one percent to forty-eight percent, not even a majority
now. So we're starting to discover that people are reflecting some of
these concerns that some of the other panelists have mentioned about
the media.
Finally, the future. The future is largely the Internet. The
Internet provides an opportunity for the graffiti on the bathroom door
to appear worldwide. We have a media Internet journalist, Matt
Drudge, who proudly claims that he gets his facts right eighty percent
of the time. One commentator has characterized the Internet as the
"Net of a thousand lies." In the future, if the Internet continues as it
appears to be moving, everyone-you, I, and everyone in this room-
will have an opportunity to be a reporter. But nobody will be an edi-
tor. And that will have profound consequences for the quality of the
discourse, the quality of the information, and potentially, for legal
liability.
Finally with regard to the Internet, and John mentioned it brief-
ly, it's an international phenomenon. One of my partners handled a
case recently where a plaintiff with a libel judgment from the U.K.
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sought to obtain enforcement in Maryland, and the Maryland Court
of Appeals, in a decision which rang of Patrick Henry and George
Washington and Benjamin Franklin said, "Not in America; we don't
have that kind of thing here. We have the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, not on the defendant," and the court simply refused to
enforce the judgment. 6
But that particular defendant had the opportunity to fight this
battle because he did not have any resources in the U.K.. If you're the
Wall Street Journal in Singapore, Time magazine in the U.K., or virtu-
ally anyone in France, you will have to fight those battles where they
arise. When John brings the battles they will likely take place there.
So we're likely to see international libel law to a degree that we
would never have expected 25 years ago, which leads me back to the
original point. And that was, that all of us are in this together, and
that what happened in Montgomery, Alabama thirty-five years ago is
very important, not only for Warsaw today but hopefully for other
countries around the world, and I hope we don't forget it. Thanks.
SKOVER: Ron, would you like to contribute your thoughts?
RONALD COLLINS: Well, it's wonderful to be back in the Pacif-
ic Northwest and to have left one Washington on the East Coast and
come to the other one here on the West Coast. And a big thank you
to Seattle University School of Law, where I have had the privilege of
teaching as a visiting professor.
Much what you've heard today might lead you to believe that the
First Amendment libel fight is between the media, (that is, the defense
bar) and those who sue them (that is, the plaintiffs bar). John
believes that the deck is stacked. Indeed it may be. If that is a true
statement, just how is it stacked? Who is favored by this deck? As
someone who works for a public interest group, I don't feel beholden
to media groups or to those who complain of the media's excesses. I
feel that there is a public interest at stake here, public interest in the
First Amendment.
It was Harry Kalven, the great First Amendment scholar who
wrote The Negro and the First Amendment 7 who talked about the First
Amendment as being essentially very important to everyday citizens.
The citizen as critic, the citizen as consumer, the citizen who could
take that right and exercise it in a way that he or she could become a
better citizen. At least, that was the free speech idea. Well, from that
vantage, how does the First Amendment work in a context where you
the public, you the people, are to receive information? Are you receiv-
16. See Telnikoffv. Matsusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. Ct. App. 1997).
17. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
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ing more information? Are you receiving better information? These
questions point to the relationship between the First Amendment and
self-governance. Does our law, as constituted and executed, allow for
real self-governance? I wonder. Without yielding to undue cynicism,
it is well to keep in mind the lessons of realism, especially in the face
of romantic idealism. It is well to know the law and the lesson as
printed in New York Times v. Sullivan, but it is equally important to
know the realism of that case, how it translates in practice, how it
translates in courtrooms, how it translates in lawyers' offices, or how it
translates in that dynamic between a lawyer and author, or between a
lawyer and activist. You know from reading Sullivan that seditious
libel is dead letter law. You've read the case and you know that. In
other words, seditious libel is something that people in Thomas Jeffer-
son's day worried about. I mean, who worries about seditious libel
anymore? We can say whatever we want about Bill Clinton, and we
do. So do we any longer have seditious libel? I think we do. Let me
explain.
Believe it or not it is a crime, it is against the law, ladies and gen-
tlemen, to disparage food in Colorado."8 Think about it. You could
make remarks about a lemon and find yourself in jail. Now, this law
wasn't something that traced back to the 18th century. It was passed
in 1994 in this very decade. It makes it a crime to speak ill of food.
Now, it makes you wonder if indeed the deck is stacked. But against
whom is it stacked? I say it is stacked against the citizen, the critic
who wishes to speak out on public issues. Quite often the laws are so
stacked that one thinks twice before making a statement. In other
words, one self-censors. Well, the bad news is Colorado.
The good news, and this reveals just how relative things are, the
good news is that in twelve other states it is just a civil wrong to speak
ill of food. Thus, for example, if you're in Alabama, 19 you cannot go
to jail for criticizing an agricultural product. You can only be sued for
general and punitive damages. And, in Ohio,2" not only can you be
sued for general and punitive damages, but a successful plaintiff can
obtain attorney's fees. Notice I said the successful plaintiff, not the
successful defendant. Now, from the vantage point of uninhibited,
robust, wide open information, how much information can be con-
veyed to you if in Colorado you can go to jail for saying certain things
disparaging food because it may be dangerous for XYZ reasons? In
18. See COLO. REV. STAT. 35-31-101 (1998); see also Thomas Kelley & Ronald Collins,
State's Food Law Is a Real Lemon, DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at H4.
19. ALA. CODE § 6-5-662 (1993).
20. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81 (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
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Alabama, you can be sued for punitive damages. In Ohio, punitive
damages plus attorneys' fees, etc., etc., etc. Now, my experience in a
public interest group is that, a lot of times, reporters or activists or
others will come to me and say, "Can I say this about a particular
product? Not about product XYZ, but just generally about oranges or
what have you." And I have to respond: "Yes, you can say it. This is
a free country. This is America. Stand on your First Amendment
rights. But it may take three years of litigation, all right?"
The Oprah case,2 you all know that. Oprah, she won the case.
At the end of the trial there was Oprah's glorious statement: "The
First Amendment rocks." Well, sure, it rocks. It's rocking to the
tune of millions of dollars in litigation costs. That case is in its forty-
fifth month of litigation-forty-five months of litigation, seventy-
some volumes of trial transcript, millions of dollars of attorneys' fees.
Why? Because Oprah Winfrey and Howard Lyman said something
about cattle, or about hamburger. The sole issue that has been liti-
gated thus far, and this gives you an idea of Sandra Baron's concerns
about the costs of litigation, is whether live cattle now on the hoof are
an agricultural product within the meaning of the statute. Most pub-
lic interest activists cannot afford that kind of litigation. They cannot
afford to litigate. Indeed, I agree, John, the decks are stacked. How
they're stacked is another matter.
I think it's important to foster idealism.., up to a point, and I
think it's a very heartening and important idealism that you find in
reading cases. It is also to appreciate the inspiring side of important
cases like New York Times v. Sullivan. But there is also the reality of
how those cases, day in and day out, become law in peoples' lives, in
terms of the courtroom, in terms of the office, and in terms of the
decisions as to what a person can or cannot say.
SKOVER: Thank you. Now, ladies and gentlemen of the audi-
ence, you can see how lively, informative and entertaining a discussion
we're likely to have. Let us now proceed to our first scenario, The
Case of Libel by Fiction. David Lodge's novel on ideas, sex, and poli-
tics in current academic circles of rhetorical studies, entitled Small
World,2" introduces a character named Professor Zapp. One of the
most celebrated postmodern theorists on the lecture circuit, Zapp is a
rather conceited and opportunistic type, who takes full advantage of
the sexual favors offered him by fawning graduate students. For those
in the know, Zapp's ideas with respect to text and meaning appear
virtually identical to those of a real-world postmodern scholar, Stanley
21. Texas Beef Group, et al., v. Oprah Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
22. DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD: AN ACADEMIC ROMANCE (1984).
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Fish. Although Zapp is not described as bearing the same physical
characteristics as Stanley Fish, soon the buzz rages within and outside
of rhetoric departments that Zapp is meant to be Fish. Even legal aca-
demics begin to notice the similarities in their intellectual agendas, like
Professor Pierre Schlag, formerly of Seattle University School of Law,
who writes an article entitled Fish v. Zapp.
Assume that, at university cocktail parties and academic confer-
ences, Stanley Fish is increasingly subjected to mean-spirited teasing.
Unkind comments run the gamut from the merely irritating, "It's a
small world after all, isn't it, Stanley?", to the utterly embarrassing and
leering wink-wink, "Hey, Zapp, how do you manage all that extracur-
ricular activity?" Finally, after a particularly graphic and perverse
comment, Fish is pushed over the edge, and he consults his attorney
about a libel suit against David Lodge, the creator of the character
Zapp. In the postmodern world of fiction, where we merge the
boundaries between fiction and nonfiction all of the time, what are
Fish's realistic and appropriate prospects of recovery for libel by fic-
tion?
SHAEFFER: I guess I need to start, since I am the person that the
professor would come and see. Really, this is the issue of whether or
not there is association with the real character. I like this case from a
libel perspective for a particular reason. One of the greatest hurdles to
get over is actual malice. If I can make the link, if I can show people
associate this Zapp character with Stanley Fish, I've got actual malice,
or an easy case to the jury of actual malice. The problem I see,
though, is the narrowness of the group you're talking about here. I
mean, how many people study postmodernism-how am I going to
sell this postmodernist rhetoric to a bunch of postal workers on a jury?
And the other problem you have with the case is the linkage of the
theory with the sexual conduct. Are people going to associate Stanley
Fish with the sexual conduct? But in terms of a libel case, this is one
that I would like more than most.
BARON: First, it is worth looking at some basics about the law.
What John is not telling you I think clearly enough is that he has to
make the case that this book is "of and concerning" his client. That is
a basic tenet in libel law. It is one of the first issues that you would
have to face. Now, as a general matter, it is not very difficult to prove
that a given statement is "of and concerning" the plaintiff. For exam-
ple, with regard to a news story that the mayor of Seattle is taking
bribes, it is not hard to figure out who it is "of and concerning." But
when you deal with a fictional case like this, I think John may have
some serious difficulties, particularly if the depiction of our fictional
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professor really is different in like and kind but for ideas, proving that
this book is really "of and concerning" his client.
SHAEFFER: Well, let's say how do I do that real quickly. All I
have to do is bring in David Lodge's friends and associates and have
them say how much David hates Stanley Fish, how much he's jealous
of this guy, how he wants to destroy his reputation, and I am begin-
ning to make a circumstantial case about "of and concerning." If I
don't have that evidence and I'm simply left with this, I've got a
harder case.
COLLINS: Of course, the "of and concerning" requirement is a
very important portion of New York Times v. Sullivan. In essence, it
says it is not enough to attempt to libel somebody generally. For libel
to exist it must be particularized. A particular person, particular time,
particular place, and some clear identity. Let me explain. The prob-
lem is whether the alleged libel involves Stanley Fish the man, or does
it involve something else? Does the criticism run to Fish the aca-
demic, or is it Fish the pervert? In other words, I may well grant what
John says. Yes, Lodge is very critical of Stanley Fish. But only Fish
as an academic man. This other matter is totally unrelated. There's
no link, if you will, between the academic criticism and the other.
BARON: Can we just note that in this little brief back and forth
you have already gotten a hint at why libel litigation is so long and so
costly? Did you hear the word "discovery" in John's voice, because he
is going to want to know a whole lot? With respect to the writer, John
is going to want discovery about what he knew, what he thought, what
he felt, what he has ever written before, and what he has ever done.
And we are going to want substantial discovery from his client. So
you might want to listen for that as we talk about these issues and the
extent of the litigation process. By the way, in international law you
will find there is very little discovery, or at least a lot less, and that is
an enormous detriment to at least defendants-I cannot speak to
plaintiffs-so while I am critical on some level of the cost of libel liti-
gation, I am certainly in agreement with many of its benefits.
SHAEFFER: Well, let's pick up on that discovery issue. I may
have to discover what David Lodge thinks of Stanley Fish, but what is
the defense going to do to my client? They're going to go after him to
see if this stuffs true or not. They're going to dig up everything about
him. Maybe he actually is a pervert.
JUDGE LASNIK: There are some plaintiffs who are actually libel-
proof plaintiffs, because their reputation is already so terrible there
isn't anything you can do to drag them down any lower, and certainly
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a vigorous defense counsel will attempt to probe and see if this par-
ticular plaintiff might fit in that category.
SKOVER: Of course, Judge, you're not implying anything about
Stanley Fish in your comments, right? We have to make sure that
Stanley Fish is not libeled here today.
SHAEFFER: Well, I just had that situation involving a recent ad
campaign by Reebok that stated that a fighter was found mentally
unfit but able to fight. They were worried that Mike Tyson was going
to sue them for libel.
JOHNSON: One of my California partners recently handled a
case involving a Globe newspaper tabloid, and the tabloid headline on
the front said, "Cops Think Kato Did It." You had to go inside and
find out that they thought he had done perjury, committed perjury.
BARON: No, in fairness to the Globe, there was a subheading on
the cover of the tabloid that arguably clarified the initial heading, but
the article was 17 pages back.
JOHNSON: All right, that's fine.
BARON: Read the smaller print.
JOHNSON: One of the problems with the "of and concerning"
test is that it makes my eyes glaze over. I have tried to explain the "of
and concerning" rule to judges, and I can assure you it is not an easy
one to explain or to fit into the litigation model. And as a matter of
fact, one of the points that underlies John's statement is that once the
plaintiff gets past "of and concerning," which may not be that hard if
there's a judge who is not particularly thoughtful or thinking, he or
she may actually have a straight shot at a jury verdict involving sub-
stantial money. Works of fiction are particularly at risk, because
under an actual malice test, if I am writing a work which I know and
believe to be fiction, the question that can be posed to me as the
author is, "Did you believe this?" "No. It's not true." And you sud-
denly have actual malice established as a matter of law because you
didn't believe it at all. So the fictionalization cases present real risk if
this "of and concerning" test or other tests are not adequately applied
early on. If they aren't, you can find yourself in front of a jury with
the potential for a large adverse judgment.
COLLINS: Given what Bruce has just said, it is of no great
moment whether or not Stanley Fish is a public figure. I mean, that
added level of protection when you're dealing with public figures
doesn't help in this the situation if you can establish actual malice.
SKOVER: Now panelists, I would like to give you a variation on
this scenario. Would it make a difference in your analysis if an ultra-
conservative political commentator, who has long decried any consid-
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eration of Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe to the Supreme
Court as a disaster to the country, were to write a novel called Hypo-
critical Overtures about a Harvard constitutional law professor named
Larry Trine, who makes harassing sexual overtures to his female
research assistants, similar in nature to those charged by Anita Hill in
Justice Clarence Thomas' Senate confirmation hearing pubic hairs on
Coke cans and all. Assume that the copyright page of the book
declares "any similarities in the characters of this book to persons liv-
ing or dead are merely coincidental." Also assume that in a magazine
interview, the author explains that he always wanted to write a fiction
story, and neither intended to track, nor did, in fact, track any of his
prior political statements about Laurence Tribe.
SHAEFFER: I guess I get to go first again. This raises another is-
sue if a person presented the same facts surrounding Clarence Thomas
attributed them to Larry Tribe, it almost becomes a parody. The
more outlandish the things written, the more likely the defense of a
parody comes into play. The second point raised by this variation is
whether or not the copyright disclaimer-the claims that this is sup-
posed to be fictional-would have any bearing. I mean, to me they're
simply self-serving statements, and really do not complicate the whole
thing here. I think this type of scenario is important, because it does
get beyond what the others said in their opening statements in that
libel addresses a number of things beyond true, good reporting. Why
is someone writing something like this? Is it going to be a million-
seller book, or is this a personal attack on someone that they're trying
to sell there? And to what extent should we endorse personal attacks?
JUDGE LASNIK: Let me ask the attorneys who practice in this
area. Judges are always trying to get cases to settle and avoid trials.
What are the dynamics when you approach the issue of settlement or
arbitration of some of these issues that are very different from the
other kinds of cases you get?
JOHNSON: The main difference, I think, is uncertainty of the
damages. In most cases, particularly most civil and commercial cases,
damages can be fairly easily estimated. Particularly in jurisdictions
where you have punitive damages this problem increases even more.
As a consequence, you have the defendants coming in thinking this is
not something that has a big number attached to it, and the plaintiffs
coming in and saying this is something which is ultragazillion dollars
in damages, and that proves to be a very big hurdle for getting folks to
arrive at a satisfactory settlement.
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JUDGE LASNIK: Do plaintiffs seek apologies more than money,
and can you sometimes avoid a lengthy lawsuit if you just get an apol-
ogy or a retraction printed?
SHAEFFER: Many times, a retraction is helpful. The media,
however, has a lot of issues above and beyond simply this one particu-
lar case. They can't be seen as someone who's willing to settle every
case that comes to them, and a lot of times they need to have some
precedent. In a case like this, if this is a book that's out there, you
want to keep this in the public eye because you're going to sell more
books. So, it really depends on what the client is seeking. Many times
the appropriate retraction is sufficient for most of the people I
represent.
BARON: Can I answer that point? For many media, at least the
ones I have worked for, worked with, a decision about a given case
becomes a matter of principle. It is a principle on two levels. One, if
you believe what you reported, and now I am thinking of news organi-
zations perhaps more than a book of fiction, it is very difficult to settle
a case. There are many clarifications possible, there are many forms of
statements news organizations can make, that separate out what they
think may have been at issue or may be the moral of the story. But a
simple blanket mea culpa may not be appropriate from their perspec-
tive. And journalists take those kinds of issues very seriously. Keep
in mind that in a lot of cases there are two sets of reputations at stake,
more so I think than in any other kind of civil litigation. There is the
plaintiff. But there is also the news organization's or the publisher's
reputation with the community for accurate and truthful reporting.
SHAEFFER: In my experience dealing in books or longer term
type articles, I think the news media really wants to get it right, so
they will sit down with you. If you can show them something is just
flat-out wrong it'll be changed and corrected. The problem, many
times, is the time isn't there to do it. Deadlines are approaching too
quickly.
JOHNSON: There are statutes, for example, that can encourage
this process. California has a particularly helpful correction statute
which triggers the ability to eliminate punitive damages and certain
other damages if there's a prompt retraction by the publisher. The
Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act is a proposed
statute which has been passed by one or two jurisdictions so far at the
behest of the Uniform Law Commissioners. The act contains a very
rigorous system for getting people early on to clarify the record and
creates incentives to do so.
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COLLINS: There's one thing that this hypothetical points out,
and it may begin to change your perspective. A lot of times we think
about libel law from the perspective of whether the individual who
makes a statement is going to be sued by someone. But in this hypo-
thetical, the big concern a writer would have wouldn't be so much
John taking him to court as it would be with dealing with the in-house
counsel for the publisher. I mean, if you talk to writers, it's not so
much the plaintiff's bar we're worried about. A lot of what writers say
can't get out there because the defense bar is so concerned and so wor-
ried that they won't allow many things to go to print. Sometimes, they
simply won't allow writers to publish a book in a robust way. I would
think that on the facts given here, the matter would never get to John
to commence a lawsuit. It probably would never even go beyond
Bruce, or Sandra, because they might well counsel against publication.
So from that vantage point, I mean, if you're a writer, you ask, "Who's
really-for lack of a better word-censoring? Who's prohibiting me
from saying what it is I want to say?" Regrettably, the answer may be
the defense lawyers themselves.
SKOVER: Thank you, panelists. Let's move on to our next sce-
nario, The Case Of Orange Outrage. Ultimate Oranges Company, a
Florida grower and distributor of oranges, uses pesticides in the pro-
duction of its crops. A local investigative reporter from KAH-TV
does a story on the hazardous side effects of the pesticide on orange
growers and pickers. This story relies on a government report that
suggests some risk in exposure to the pesticide. Several industry-sup-
ported studies, however, categorically refute these findings. On the
TV program, a government spokesman who is interviewed states, "It
is not known at this time what detrimental effects the use of such pes-
ticides may have on consumers of oranges, but caution is always in
order." A flamboyant Hollywood movie star finishes the episode with
the comment, "I'll never eat Florida oranges again!" Within days of
the report, orange sales in the region plummet. Subsequently, Ulti-
mate Oranges Company sues the reporter and her TV station under
the common law of libel and Florida's food disparagement statute. So
far as liability is concerned, how do the reporter's statements pertain-
ing to worker's safety differ, if at all, from the statements regarding
safety to consumers of oranges?
SHAEFFER: I guess I go first again. First of all, I think I should
apologize for the failing of my opening statements. I didn't anticipate
the argument that was going to be made about the deck being stacked
against the plaintiff. I think this is the perfect example of this. If I
simply had a defamation claim with these facts I would lose. I mean,
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there's someone expressing an opinion, "I'm never going to eat an
orange again," I'm not going to be able to do anything with that. The
interesting issue that really is unresolved now is the status of the food
disparagement laws which the agricultural producers are using as an
end-run around the First Amendment. I can't get them for libel, I'm
going to get them for this unique thing called trade disparagement,
and that's what has the media scared to death. As was pointed out,
you can defame Bill Clinton but you can't defame an orange.
JOHNSON: At the risk of confusing apples and oranges, this
bears a close resemblance to the case that I handled several years ago.23
What was puzzling about it is that in the lawsuit, which involved
CBS' 60 Minutes and the story about alar, is that the case law dealing
with product disparagement generally, and even the case law regarding
these agricultural disparagement statutes, is remarkably unclear. By
contrast, libel law is a very stable body of law, currently. So what we
were faced with was a particularly unknown, unexplored territory
where the guideposts, both legal and factual, were few. It took six
years for that case to be disposed of finally, from filing date in the
Yakima County Superior Court to final denial of certiorari in the U.S.
Supreme Court. As it turned out, the basic problem was that the
plaintiffs could never prove the broadcast was false, in part because
scientists disagreed over the ultimate risks of a particular pesticide
which had been pulled off the market by its producer. And, ulti-
mately, the lawsuit became a battle of experts, so you can imagine the
costs of litigation involving eight experts opining as to what might
happen in the next sixty years should alar have remained in our food
supply. They were all over the map.
COLLINS: This hypothetical raises two basic concerns. One is
worker safety. You know, the people who work with the pesticide. Is
it really injurious to their health? Next, there are the people who con-
sume the products that have the pesticide in them. From the vantage
point of any cause of action, so far as worker safety is concerned, that's
probably a loser case. Criticizing oranges, by contrast, is a different
matter. The food-libel statutes as they exist in Florida and elsewhere
may allow for a disparagement lawsuit. If you're a reporter or a public
interest advocate or whomever, it's not enough to say, "I relied on a
government report." You'd think a government report is enough.
You can go out and report on it, but not really. For example, has the
reporter checked other relevant studies? The response would be,
"Well, those are industry studies, they're industry supported," to
23. Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995).
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which plaintiffs counsel would reply, "But have you checked them?
Have you compared them?"
But our reporter is not a scientist. She must get the information
out to the public. So does that mean she can't report about what the
government says? Well, you can report it, but you might be liable.
Now, I believe such food-libel statutes are clearly unconstitutional.
Still, the question is: Can one speak out in the face of threatened and
costly litigation? Can you afford to win? Can you even afford to fight
the fight? I think the chill is just too great. What that means is forced
silence.
JUDGE LASNIK: I think you have to look at it from the perspec-
tive of an industry that has ways to counteract bad publicity-adver-
tising, press conferences and the like. Why is this an effective way
that you can counteract Dan Lewis? Our hypothetical has a regional,
local television reporter making the report, and Seattle has regionally
focused news reporting. Well, if you file a high-profile lawsuit and
end up on national television, now you've distributed that negative
information to a much wider audience, and you may see national sales
of oranges go down. So in the equation of what is the purpose of the
lawsuit-you're not going to get a quick resolution of a lawsuit in this
day and age as it goes forward, and you could just generate more bad
publicity for your product.
SHAEFFER: Well, you can see the economic perspective coming
from the agricultural community. If they see a precipitous drop in
sales because of something they don't believe is true, they're looking
for a remedy, they're looking to fashion some sort of prevention effect.
There is a broad spectrum here. The situation is a little different if
you're doing a product comparison. If I'm the maker of Clorox bleach
and I decide to say that someone else's bleach is inferior for all of these
reasons, that supports a different type of cause of action under the
Lanham Act than a reporter making adverse statements about some
product. I think everyone in the room should be able to see that
there's a problem here, but can you fashion a remedy?
JOHNSON: The British and the French can provide some guid-
ance. Many years ago it was uncovered that there was a risk of Jakob-
Kreutzfeld's disease by consuming British meat products. This is a
variant on "mad cow" disease, which was the subject of the Oprah
story. The British government began taking additional steps to
improve the meat supply, and the European Union basically certified
British beef products throughout the European Union. The French
decided no, this wasn't safe enough for the French, and they were
going to outlaw all British meat products. Last month the British
20001
Seattle University Law Review
came up with the perfect solution. There was a news article talking
about the fact that the French regularly dumped sewage into their
chicken feed, and, as a matter of fact, what happened at that time was
that French products in Britain began to be the subject of a consumer
boycott. They are in the process now of working things out. More
speech is sometimes better than less speech when dealing with false
speech.
SKOVER: Let us move now to The Case of Little White Lies.
George Guy, a middle-level manager at Almus-Chambers, a chemical
manufacturing plant in Eu Claire, Wisconsin, contacts his friend,
Amy Cary, a reporter at the La Crosse Daily Journal, a newspaper
serving the Greater Coulee region, including Eu Claire. George tips
Amy off to worker safety violations that he suspects are occurring at a
consistently increasing rate in his chemical plant. Assuming an alias
and representing herself as an industry-experienced professional, Amy
is hired as George's secretary and spends three weeks at Almus-
Chambers secretly documenting and photographing questionable con-
ditions and events. Leaving her secretarial post, Amy writes a front-
page expose on incidents that the newspaper's legal counsel deter-
mines to be unquestionable worker safety violations under state and
federal laws.
At that point Almus-Chambers fires George Guy, and sues him,
Amy Cary, and the La Crosse Daily Journal in the Western Wisconsin
federal district court, contending that the defendants perpetrated fraud
and trespass in gathering information for the expos&. Assuming,
arguendo, that there were violations of state common law, the defend-
ants raise, by a summary judgment motion, a First Amendment
defense to any such state law prohibitions. The defendants invoke the
U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' recent ruling in the Food Lion
case, a lawsuit that the media attorney Floyd Abrams called "an
attempted end run around the First Amendment." Assuming that
there is ample evidence to support a jury finding of state common law
fraud and trespass, should the press be immunized from such liability
under the First Amendment's protection of newsgathering privileges?
Should journalists be allowed to tell small lies in order to report large
private corporate wrongs?
SHAEFFER: For me this raises the point I made in my opening
statement, that the public likes to hear the ultimate story. They don't
like the fact that reporters will lie, cheat, and steal to get to the story.
Libel is not a good vehicle for pursuing this kind of case. What was
curious about this case is that they threw in all these common law torts
in an effort to, as Abrams said, make an end run around the First
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Amendment. What the issue comes down to is, should reporters be
treated differently than anyone else with respect to common tort liabil-
ity?
BARON: I think the First Amendment bar is struggling probably
more today on this question of the relationship of the First Amend-
ment to these common law torts than at any time in my experience in
the practice of media law. Bruce mentioned Cohen v. Cowles. Cohen is
certainly the simple answer that a lot of plaintiffs' counsels, and, I
would suggest to you, not very thoughtful judges, have applied in
these instances. But they do so without reading the majority opinion
in Cohen very carefully to see all that Justice White had to say there
about how these laws of general applicability can be applied to the
press, provided that they only had incidental effects on news gather-
ing.
In addition, the decision contains as a not unimportant caveat the
fact that the plaintiff was not trying to obtain reputational harm dam-
ages. This point is being picked up by the courts, which are consis-
tently holding that reputational damages will not be allowed in these
cases. The word "doctrinal" is one I have always found difficult to get
out, but perhaps it applies in this instance. The doctrinal approach of
applying the First Amendment to these claims, I think, is something
that is very much a work in progress right now.
JOHNSON: One of the interesting things about the Food Lion
decision is that the jury awarded $5.5 million to the plaintiff, a large
grocery chain in that particular case, and the Fourth Circuit reduced
that to two dollars. Now, consider the significance to the media when
the jury basically treats a two dollars claim as a $5.5 million claim, the
risk it presents to the press. But you should also think about the
incentive structure built into this type of litigation in the future. Will
the plaintiffs lawyer really want to take a case where the contingency
fee is sixty cents?
SHAEFFER: Well, in an instance like this, you know, represent-
ing a major corporation probably would not be on a contingency fee
basis. The interesting point that we were discussing beforehand is, if I
was bringing this type of a case, I may only sue for trespass and com-
mon law torts without any libel claim, and attempt to keep out of evi-
dence the truth or veracity of what was actually said in the story. So,
keep the presentation of all the doctored meats and all the horrible
things that have actually been done in my market and say, well, see,
they just trespassed, so I should get an award.
JUDGE LASNIK: I think--don't overlook John's point about
the-it's not a contingency fee case. This is not an injury suffered by
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an injured party case as much as it is a corporate entity attempting to
fight for its corporate life, the same way it would in a commercial
venture, and, therefore, it would use a combination of probably in-
house counsel and corporate counsel with premium experts on how to
make end runs around the First Amendment. And I think that-I've
not had to deal with this on the bench, and of course each case has its
own kind of facts, but I think we as panelists can imagine general-the
laws of general applicability that we don't want the media to violate,
and we can imagine those that we do, and again go back to a civil dis-
obedience sense. If the only way to really cover the story is to go to
where the migrant workers live, which happens to be on the grower's
ground, to get the story, that's going to be looked at differently than a
situation where the only reason you sneaked the hidden camera in
there was not really to gather news, but because you're a television
show and you have to have something visual, and so that's justification
for using the camera.
BARON: I think there is an interesting tension that is going to go
on in this litigation as it goes forward. There is the corporate desire,
and this is generally corporations, large entities bringing this litiga-
tion--corporate desire not so much to get damages from the press any-
more, because that does not seem to be terribly likely in these cases,
but simply to stop them from reporting in this manner. You are not
going to come into my plant and show that I abuse my workers or
whatever it is that the press is seeking to uncover and expose. The
way I am going to stop you is by bringing this kind of litigation.
Eventually, the press will back off. They won't do undercover report-
ing anymore. Compare this to the other reality that a corporation has
to face, which is that any litigation keeps the subject of the undercover
reporting in the public eye for the life of the litigation. It's all well and
good to say it is only going to bring trespass and fraud claims, and by
doing so prevent the jury from seeing the actual new report, which
showed something about the company in a bad light. But the fact is,
that is going to be publicized, and by bringing this kind of claim, Food
Lion-to use a real life example-stayed in the public eye for years
and years after the 20/20 piece publicized the fact that Food Lion
would sell chicken after its original sell date had expired. So, I think
there's going to be this very interesting back and forth within corpo-
rate headquarters between these two results that may be mutually
inconsistent.
COLLINS: It's hard to make a free speech defense when the First
Amendment is not part of the equation, when just the law of torts
governs. Even with the common law and all its protections, there has
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to be a certain First Amendment sensitivity as you apply common law
doctrine to a situation. In a sense, you can never exclude the First
Amendment simply because a particular cause of action has not been
pleaded to the court.
SHAEFFER: Obviously, this entity is not suing because someone
trespassed on their store. They're suing for damage to their reputa-
tion. They are suing because they're trying to vindicate their reputa-
tion, albeit in kind of a ridiculous way, since they kept the story in the
press for a long time. That may be a new way for the courts to really
look at this. Is the ultimate remedy sought reputation, even if that's
not for the award, and I think that's where the First Amendment sen-
sitivity needs to come in. And, as it was said, we can all probably
come up with torts in this type of instance where there is a need for
relief other than rehabilitation of reputation.
JOHNSON: Well, there's an interesting print versus broadcast
dilemma underlying this particular hypothetical. Historically, the
news media have reported information provided to them by corporate
insiders about such things as tainted food, bad meat, and the like.
The print media will still report those facts without too much fear of
liability. The problem comes when the electronic media attempt to
corroborate that information, to provide the visual evidence that basi-
cally establishes once and for all that the problem is there. For some
odd reason, the courts are creating a different rule of law, potentially,
for the electronic media for disclosing the same information that could
be disclosed with virtual impunity in a newspaper.
I find that a very troubling distinction, but it's a product of the
technology and of courts' uncertainty about the risks associated with
publicizing truthful information that broadly, that effectively, to
members of the public. And yet from the standpoint of the media, to
quote a recent Second Circuit case, video and other visual guidance"can provide unimpeachably objective evidence.., this type of to
support the points being made."24
SKOVER: Thank you, panelists. Our last scenario for discussion
today is The Case of the Cyberspace Public Figure. In contemporary
constitutional law, the mass media are far less likely to be found liable
for defamation if they focus on public figures rather than private ones.
As you know, the "public figure" concept is tied to two premises.
First, average citizens typically have more limited access to the mass
media than public figures to combat false or misleading statements.
Second, individuals who thrust themselves into the common domain
must expect their names to be bandied about with greater frequency
24. Gonzales v. NBC, Inc., 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999).
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and with greater error. Based on these two premises, is the traditional
division between public and private figures likely to be as sharp in
cyberspace? Take the case of a conservative moralist who launches a
website called Family Values, that publishes his personal articles and
provides RealAudio recordings of his personal essays on the decline of
Judeo-Christian marital and family relationships. The website catches
the attention and imagination of the fundamentalist right, and after a
year of operation, has become relatively renowned, receiving some one
thousand hits a day. Subsequently, the moralist is falsely accused of
marital infidelity by the editor of an electronic column, Net Gossip,
that is the liberal counterpart to the Drudge Report. Should the con-
servative moralist sue the editor of Net Gossip, is he entitled any longer
to the law's protections for private figures?
BARON: No. That to me seems pretty straightforward and fairly
simple. It seems to me that someone who takes the initiative and
inserts himself or herself, or itself in the case of an entity, into a con-
troversial realm as this gentleman has done, and has the ability to
respond, indeed, one could say he picked the fight, is unlikely to be
found to be a private figure. Correctly, I think he would be found to
be a public figure.
SHAEFFER: I would look at it just a little bit different. I think
the one thing the Internet has done is really reduce the barriers by
which an individual can respond. I think the key fact here is that this
person has a presence on the Internet and, therefore, has the ability on
the Internet to respond to the Internet community. I think you would
be drawing a sharp distinction if the story was picked up in the New
York Times and published to everyone as to whether or not he is a
public figure in a media beyond the Internet, and that's a distinction
I'm not aware that any case has drawn.
JOHNSON: What's interesting is that I think Andy Warhol's
comment can be paraphrased, "In the future everyone will be a public
figure in 15 minutes with the Internet." I said that all of us are report-
ers on the Internet, all of us will probably also become public figures
on the Internet. What's interesting to see in the next ten to twenty
years is whether the law responds to this different dynamic, in that the
prototypical case is no longer the large media entity, with significant
financial resources and the ability to speak loudly and clearly across
the nation, versus a single plaintiff who has no access to the media to
get his or her reputation corrected. We may find a leveling of the
playing field and therefore a different paradigm with regard to libel
law within twenty to thirty years, which I find to be a very interesting
development.
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COLLINS: If you're a public figure in cyberspace, in a cyber-
space publication, are you perforce a public figure in print publica-
tions? For example, let's say that this whole scenario was covered by
the Los Angeles Times Online. Now if the Los Angeles Times Online
took that same story and printed it in its print edition, same situation,
do we still have a public figure? Can we assume that because one is a
public figure in cyberspace that he or she will be perforce be a public
figure outside that realm? Such questions are certainly ones that are
likely to arise in many cases of libel.
BARON: It has been interesting to me that, considering the
enormity now of the amount of speech, just the sheer volume of
speech on the Internet, that there really has been relatively little libel
or invasion of privacy litigation. It is coming. We see it, follow it.
We're watching it build. Much of the early litigation in the Internet
has been in trademark law, copyright law, intellectual property, and
not in libel and privacy. But I was also quite astonished to realize
when teaching a class of journalism students no more than a year ago
how few of them realized that the basic laws of libel and invasion of
privacy apply not only to our conservative evangelistic, with his well-
known and frequently-hit Internet site, but to their e-mail. To your e-
mail. Back and forth. That libel law does not require much in the
way of publication. One person is sufficient. And I think as people
begin to realize that the fundamental laws of libel and privacy in fact
apply to this new media, you are going to see a great deal more litiga-
tion raising some of the more esoteric issues that we are discussing,
such as who is a public figure, who is a private figure. You know, it is
going to be worked out, but it is going to be worked out, I think, with
a lot of very ordinary human beings in the litigation, unlike so much of
the big media litigation which involves big entities on both sides.
SHAEFFER: The one last point that was made, and it does raise
another spectrum as was just mentioned, is the advance in intellectual
property law in terms of cross-border implications of being able to
bring suits anywhere. I think libel may hit the same level that when
you publish something on the Internet, are you publishing it all over
the world with respect to libel?
JOHNSON: Here is another interesting issue that is implied, I
think, in some of Sandy's comments, and that is the issue of what
happens if libel law is extended to virtually everything on the Internet.
Which it is, legally speaking. But we have been talking to the last
thirty-five years in this country about a regime of constitutional law
applicable to defamation, which turns upon a four letter-excuse me,
four word statement, "matter of public concern." In 1964 New York
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Times v. Sullivan created a new constitutional rule where the press
dealt with matters of public concern involving a public official, and,
thereafter, a public figure. Even Gertz,25 that 1974 U.S. Supreme
Court case dealing with private individuals, stated a rule that at least
required negligence on the part of the media before liability could be
imposed involving a statement on a matter of public concern involving
a private individual.
What happens when the Internet and email start generating
things which, clearly, no court would look at as matters of public con-
cern but is simply gossip? At that point, we may find ourselves rely-
ing on the rules of the British common law and the old days of
presumed damages, strict liability, and a system of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press that people would find astonishing, if in fact
that is the way things go.
COLLINS: Bruce, one answer to the question of what will hap-
pen to matters of public concern, one of the things that could happen
is our whole notion of such matters could change. In other words,
matters of public concern may cease to be limited to political matters.
Matters of entertainment may well become matters of public concern.
We suggested so much in our book, The Death of Discourse.26
JOHNSON: There's a case pending in the New York Court of
Appeals right now27 which deals with a related issue, the Chapedeau28
gross irresponsibility standard enunciated in New York, but it turns
upon whether a media publication dealing with Hollywood stars'
divorce or entertainment figures' divorce proceedings-
BARON: She argues that the divorce implicated the question
whether black women are faring poorly under divorce laws.
JOHNSON: And the trial court, I think, or actually it'd be appel-
late division, said that that's not really a matter of public concern,
that's simply a divorce. So there are some cracks in the system and it's
important to watch the developments as we move forward.
SKOVER: I find something potentially troubling about the com-
ments that you have been making, and I would like to follow up on
this. Starting with Sandy's categorical answer that this person would
be a public figure, does it not follow that the more "Net" public fig-
ures we have, the less "Net" libel we are likely to have? And then
there is the distinction between a public figure on the "Net" versus a
public figure in the traditional press. Is it not unseemly that we could
25. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26. See supra note 10.
27. See Huggins v. Moore, 726 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1999).
28. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196 (1975).
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have the New York Times Online law of libel versus the New York
Times print law of libel with respect to this gentleman in the scenario?
Are we going to develop two different bodies of law in libel, depend-
ing on the media involved?
BARON: I don't want to be too categorical about my answer to
that. I think the reason this case is easy, in a sense, is that inserting
one's self into a controversy of the day, which this gentleman has
done, is generally one of the criteria for a public figure. I think that is
going to translate from the web to the newspaper, and if an issue is of
sufficient energy and controversy that it migrates from a website to the
New York Times Online to the New York Times in print, I think the
analysis is going to hold up. I think it's because it has generated suffi-
cient heat and weight that he's going to be a public figure up and
down the line.
I do think, however, eventually in some of these cases that are
coming up, that the issues are so slight that only on the Internet are
people getting exercised about it, and you may find a new body of law
that says, it does distinguish that one can be a public figure for pur-
poses of controversy that is uniquely interesting on the Internet but,
really, has not the same kind of juice when you get out into the com-
munity at large. I think it's possible.
SHAEFFER: From a more practical perspective, the way I see the
law evolving is-and this is my own personal opinion-is that every-
thing has become an issue of public concern. I can't think of anything
right now that isn't an issue of public concern. So virtually everyone,
as we just pointed out, is going to be a public figure.
JUDGE LASNIK: Can you really defame someone on the Internet
who's Internet tag is "NastyAss45?"
BARON: There is the international aspect of this. Amazon.com,
for example, is in litigation right now in England over a book about
Northern Ireland that was offered on Amazon.com.UK as well as
Amazon.com.US. I believe Amazon.com.UK for a brief period pulled
the book off of its lists a result of the litigation.
There is a scientist in England who has taken to suing everyone.
I mean, he provokes fights and when people respond with critical
things about him, he sues them. And he sued, in fact, a student at
Cornell University, as well as, I think, at the University of Minnesota.
I don't remember all of the people he has sued, but he has sued people
all over the world. The U.K. courts took jurisdiction. Query how all
of this internationalization of communication and literary commerce is
going to affect the law of libel. And I know Bruce has views on this,
so I'll give him the softball.
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JOHNSON: There's another interesting Amazon.com story, and
that is that Amazon.com is in trouble or got in trouble in Germany
because there's a law against selling Mein Kampf. And you can pur-
chase it on Amazon.com even if you are accessing it from Germany.
So, for a while Amazon.com tried to figure out how to sell Mein
Kampf to various people without running afoul of German law, and it
is impossible really to conduct business on the Internet on a jurisdic-
tion by jurisdiction basis.
So we may find ourselves with the least common denominator.
One of the areas of Internet liability which I think is worth touching
upon is privacy law. We've seen in the last several weeks some law-
suits against Real Networks, another Seattle company, arising out of
alleged invasions of privacy dealing with the use of data compiled
through click-throughs by customers. I think that this is one of the
areas where you are really going to see major litigation on the Internet.
Not so much defamation, since we will all be public figures for fifteen
minutes, but really privacy. There are discussions going on right now
between the European Union and the United States over the extent to
which the European Union's Data Directive, which prohibits the col-
lection of certain information about individuals, will be enforced or
enforceable against American companies. The consequence of failing
to achieve an agreement will be a trade war, so I fully expect to see an
agreement within the next few months. But you may see European
attitudes toward privacy being imposed on American companies.
Anyone who has seen Jennicam2 9 knows that Americans have a
slightly different attitude toward privacy than Europeans. Perhaps
because we have to pay our way through college, and therefore having
jennicam.com may be a useful way to do it. But we will find ourselves
dealing with very different issues of privacy than what we're used to in
the area of libel, and I fully expect to see the privacy issue being liti-
gated rather thoroughly in the next several years.
COLLINS: You tend to think of the Internet as exporting First
Amendment values for the whole world, as if somehow the whole
world will accept our First Amendment perspective on life. And yet
from the comments we have heard today, it could work just the other
way. In other words, we could be importing the common law and
statutory law of other countries. That could be the case, at least in
terms of the policy decisions that Internet service providers make as to
what they will or will not allow to appear on their websites.
SHAEFFER: I want to make the point, one thing that you hear
interesting on this panel is the number of different people who repre-
29. See <http://www.jennicam.org>.
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sent media companies. And putting on my other hat, an intellectual
property practice hat, that area has developed much more vigorously
in the international arena. We have the Berne Convention, we have a
number of conventions and treaties that are attempting to create a
international view of copyright protection and trademark protection
that'll be recognized throughout the world. I think that maybe a
fruitful area in the near future will try to develop international libel
laws, notions of speech and protection of speech, which to me are
almost synonymous with notions of intellectual property, similarly
protected by the national treaty.
JOHNSON: Every practicing lawyer has a law review article that
he or she wishes he could someday sit down and write. Mine has
always been an article which would argue that New York Times v. Sul-
livan flowed directly from a 1946 U.S. Supreme Court case, Inter-
national Shoe v. State of Washington.3"
In the 19th century we had contests of jurisdiction which were
very geographically limited. And the New York Times could not be
found in the state of Alabama to be sued under Pennoyer v. Neff.31
But under the long arm statute in International Shoe v. the State of
Washington, even with only 13 or so copies of the New York Times
available in Alabama, even with a policy by the New York Times not to
allow any correspondent to go within the state, the State of Alabama
was able to assert jurisdiction over this New York institution.
It does call to mind the "house divided" speech of 1860 by
Abraham Lincoln, that once we became a union we actually had to
one degree or another to develop a case law which would be applicable
to all of us. And with International Shoe the peculiarities of Alabama
law or of Alabama views about civil rights became national problems.
I fully expect to see the same principle apply, either for good or for ill,
in the international arena in the next thirty years.
SKOVER: Thank you. With that last eloquent and totalizing
comment that brings your first year of law school back to you, this
portion of our program, the roundtable discussion, will end. But
before we begin questions from the audience, give a healthy round of
applause to this panel. Thank you. Please come up to the micro-
phones to ask your questions.
QUESTION: My name's Pat, and I'm a retired attorney. I'm a
friend of Bruce's, and we like to compete with how far we can push the
clock back. I have a statement first and then a question. Bruce
pushed his inspiration back twenty-five years. I want to go back 240
30. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
31. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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years, when a young reporter wrote an article that said, among other
things, that the British Governor of Massachusetts had bad breath,
and the young attorney, Andrew Hamilton, argued to the jury it was
true. And the judge instructed the jury that truth is no defense to
libel, and that was the law at the time. And the real heroes in the case
were the American jury who said this is nonsense and acquitted the
defendant, who was Peter.
JOHNSON: Peter. An early affluent in New York of jury nullifi-
cation.
QUESTION: Yeah. But there's where I get my inspiration. Now
my question. I miss Senator Proxmire and I miss the Golden Fleece.
Proxmire used to award a golden fleece to people who had government
grants and did silly things with them, or at least he thought they did
silly things with them, you know, like go to Hawaii and look at snails
or something, eat them or whatever. And he stopped doing it long
before he stopped being a senator. The reason was that these people
getting government money were usually private figures. You know,
just some guy in a university. It always seemed to me that the law of
libel was a little bit over-broad and that we ought to at least look at
what private people do with public money when you give it, and
maybe you don't make your inquiry go any further, sort of like what
you're talking about on the Internet. Certainly, it's in the public
interest to know what people are doing with the grant money, and
some of it's quite considerable, and the public figure law ought to
apply at least in that narrow space, not go any further. So my question
is, if we could write down the law of libel with all its ambiguities and
its future developments and call it a statute, would it meet Supreme
Court requirements for narrowness? Seeing as it can be over-broad
and vague, and has anyone raised this question?
BARON: Well, among the various doctrines in libel, the question
of who is a public figure and who is not, I think, is one of the messiest
and murkiest. There are cases, by the way-I'm not sure I can cite a
few right now-where people who are participating in public projects,
an architect hired to design public buildings, a psychologist hired to
review the case of a particular child for a custody dispute, have been
held to be at least a public official, if not a public figure. But to
answer your question, the Supreme Court has tried to identify what it
thinks are the restrictions the First Amendment imposes on libel law.
If one were to craft a libel law that in practice exceeded that, that is,
that allowed public figure qualifications to apply beyond what the
Supreme Court has indicated are sort of the limits the First Amend-
ment? I think the Court would say it is fine, you are allowed to go
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beyond the First Amendment in terms of affording protection to the
news media. You are just not allowed to go in the other direction. So
if you wanted to declare anyone who gets public money to be a public
official or public figure, I don't think the Supreme Court would have
an objection.
SHAEFFER: Unless, of course, you could make some argument
that it ran afoul of some other constitutional protection.
QUESTION: I have another question. It seems to me that the
First Amendment is so American that it is practically an ingredient in
apple pie, and one of the big issues that has come in here several times
is the effect of international litigation on First Amendment values and
First Amendment rights. The First Amendment must have, in addi-
tion to its normative justifications, it must have instrumental justifica-
tions-some effect it produces in United States that we value that is
not produced in another country with a vibrant political culture, like
France, or England, or Germany. I would like to know what you
believe that effect is, what do we have as a result of the First Amend-
ment that they do not have because they don't have a First
Amendment?
JOHNSON: Let me hazard a guess. I think clearly they're a free
society as we're a free society, and a broad definition of freedom would
encompass what is available in Britain, Germany, and France, and in
newly developing countries in Eastern Europe, Japan, Korea, plus the
United States and other countries around the world. What is unique
about this country is the freedom of association, as Alexis de Toque-
ville observed in 1835 when he visited Jacksonian America. Ameri-
cans formed associations for virtually everything. The nonprofit
sector is what I'm speaking of to a large degree. People volunteer here.
They do so in numbers seen in few other countries. I've had visitors
come to the States and be astonished at the amount of volunteer time
that goes into projects here in Seattle, people who devote their
resources to volunteering. You simply don't have that voluntary
sector, for one reason or another, in many other societies. Perhaps
because American capitalism is as strenuously capitalistic as it is, that
voluntary sector is very important to the health of our society. And I
think this sector really does depend upon ample First Amendment
protections in order to survive.
SHAEFFER: To bring this back to libel law, I think it would
come down to, and I don't know how you would prove this, the bit-
terness of the debate. When the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky affair
was going on you always heard everyone in Europe saying, well, this
would never be such a media event in Europe. So yeah, people are
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subject to, I think, public officials in the United States are subject to a
degree of scrutiny that they may not be subject to overseas. Is that a
good thing? We tend to think it is. It may not be.
BARON: There is also the question of opinion. Americans in
this case are given the right to express a lot of opinion. Some of them
positive, some of them angry. If you look at European law, you will
see that there is a lot of legislation and case law that really puts the lid
on opinion. I think Americans would find it very difficult, quite hon-
estly, to accept some of the cultural norms of European and Asian
culture. I agree with you. I think it is an interesting question that
some scholars should take up. What specifically are the differences
between us and them in terms of our press, and in the bigger exami-
nation of public figures and public officials, our ability to express the
vehemence of our views?
COLLINS: In all of this it is well to remember two points. Our
constitutional protections are the First Amendment and its state con-
stitutional counterparts. State constitutions can be used to give a
greater level of constitutional protection. So obviously, the First
Amendment is just a federalist floor in our federalist society-it is the
first of several tiers of protection.
My second point concerns the language of the First Amendment.
It is the making of the law that is problematic. Insofar as the First
Amendment counsels against the making of laws abridging speech, it
perforce attempts to prevent litigation. It's supposed to come into
play at the very level of the lawmaking process. Given that, I wonder
what sort of institutional checks we might one day have to somehow
bring the First Amendment into the lawmaking process, at the very
first instance where the first threat occurs. What could we do institu-
tionally in the legislative process itself to begin to protect free speech
values such that they don't have to be litigated after the fact? Maybe
it's a bad claim, but permit me to launch it nonetheless: free speech is
above the law of lawmakers-that, at least, is the great premise of our
First Amendment.
[Vol. 23:849
